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Abstract
We provide general conditions under which an economic theory has a universal ax-
iomatization: one that leads to testable implications. Roughly speaking, if we obtain a
universal axiomatization when we assume that unobservable parameters (such as prefer-
ences) are observable, then we can obtain a universal axiomatization purely on observ-
ables. The result “explains” classical revealed preference theory, as applied to individual
rational choice. We obtain new applications to Nash equilibrium theory and Pareto
optimal choice.
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1 Introduction
Revealed preference (RP) theory is the name given to economic theories whose goal is to
understand the testable implications of preference-based choice models when preferences
are unobservable. The classical model assumes that maximization of some preference
relation governs choices from a budget set, and that this preference relation is unobserved.
Modern day economics is more permissive in what it means by RP theory, but the idea
remains of characterizing the empirical content of a given economic model when some
parameters are unobserved.
RP theory presents a special methodological challenge. In all RP exercises, given an
economic theory, one postulates that reality behaves as if that theory were true. The
goal is to understand the testable implications of the theory. The problem, however, with
the as-if statement is that it violates a basic tenet of positivist scientific methodology.
Specifically, RP theory is an empirical approach that need not necessarily lead to a
falsifiable theory.
RP theory, and the as-if approach, is usually formulated existentially, as opposed to
universally. A universal theory is falsifiable; an existential theory is not. We can explain
the distinction using an example of Popper (1959): Theory E states “There is a white
swan,” while theory U states “All swans are white.” Theory E is existential: It is not
falsifiable because no matter how many finite data sets of non-white swans we discover,
they do not contradict the existence (somewhere) of a white swan. On the other hand, U
is a universal theory because it makes a statement about every individual swan. Theory
U is falsifiable because the observation of one non-white swan falsifies the theory.
∗Chambers and Echenique acknowledge support from the NSF through grant SES-0751980.
We make a distinction between the RP formulation of a theory and the RP theory
itself. When we speak of the RP formulation of a theory, we mean a description of
the theory which is existentially quantified, where the existential quantification operates
directly on unobservable objects, usually preferences.1 For example “there is a rational
preference relation generating the observed choices.” The RP theory itself is a description
of the datasets for which there exist preferences (or other unobservable parameters) for
which the data are consistent with those preferences.
Even though we do not observe preferences, a possible test of the theory is to check
each possible preference, and see if that preference could generate the observed data.
In general, there are an infinite number of possible preferences. Therefore, the RP for-
mulation is as problematic as “there is a white swan,” because no matter how many
unobservable preferences fail to explain the data, we cannot conclude that the data fal-
sify the theory.
While the RP formulation of classical choice theory is existentially quantified, the
RP theory of classical choice is, in fact, falsifiable. This is so because there is a theo-
rem establishing the equivalence of the theory specified by the RP formulation and a
particular universal axiomatization, where the universal quantification operates directly
on observable data. Consider the classical theory of the consumer. The RP formulation
states that a consumer behaves as if there is a utility function that is maximized by her
choices. We know from Samuelson (1938) and Houthakker (1950) that the RP theory
has a universal axiomatization: namely the strong axiom of revealed preference. Note
that the strong axiom of revealed preference is an axiom (actually a collection of axioms)
describing conditions on observable data. Thus, despite being formulated existentially
over unobservable parameters, the classical theory of the consumer is falsifiable. In fact,
the Samuelson-Houthakker representation is important precisely because it is univer-
sally quantified over observable data, and therefore provides a test of the theory. The
same is true of more abstract theories of individual choice; the most general universal
characterization is probably the one in Richter (1966).
Our main result is to prove that, under very general conditions, the RP formulation
of an economic theory always admits a universal representation. As applications, we
study theories of collective choice: Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal choice, for
example. The RP formulation of these theories is existential, and to obtain universal
1For readers who know model theory, when we speak of existential quantification, we are really
talking about second order logic. Existential quantification over preferences is an example of existential
quantification over predicates.
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characterizations has proven very difficult. Our main result implies that these theories
always admit a universal representation.
As a corollary we give conditions under which it can be determined that a theory
has been falsified. Under some conditions (which are satisfied for Nash equilibrium and
Pareto optimal choice, for example) there is an algorithm that, when presented with a
falsifying data set will determine that the theory has been falsified. It cannot, however,
certify that a data set validates a theory: this is the classical Popperian dichotomy that
says that a scientific theory can never be proven correct, only falsified.
Our results follow from a general theorem involving the statements one can make
about observable and theoretical terms. The classical revealed preference theory is exis-
tential, as we explained above. However, if we imagine that preferences are observable
then we can describe the theory using purely universal statements (this description would
be an axiomatization, or a test, of the theory, in the fictitious case where preferences are
observable). We prove that, whenever that is the case, the universal axiomatization in-
volving both unobservables and observables can be “projected” onto observables. The
result is a universal axiomatization that makes statements purely about observables.
Our results build on basic work on model theory and mathematical logic. We suppose
an observer formulates a theory about behavior, and that the formulation follows the
framework of standard (first order) mathematical logic. Specifically, the theory is in
terms of a relational first order language L. For example, in the classical individual choice
model, we may suppose that an observer hypothesizes that there exists a pair of relations
,, where  is the strict part of  and  is a weak order.2 These relations govern
hypothetical choices, and there is another pair of relations R and P which correspond to
the actual observed choices; R and P are usually called the revealed preference relations.
The observer hypothesizes that whenever x R y, then x  y and whenever x P y, then
x  y; however, the converse implications need not hold.
It is well known that, given a pair R and P , there exists a pair ,  conforming
to the above hypotheses if and only if there are no cycles involving R and at least one
occurrence of P . This latter property is called the strong axiom of revealed preference.
The strong axiom of revealed preference includes only statements involving R and P ,
hence it relates directly to observables. Moreover, it can be written with a collection of
universal sentences; hence it is falsifiable. Note the general exercise: we assume a theory
2A weak order is complete and transitive.
3
can be described using unobservable relations. We want to test, using the observed
relations only, whether or not the theory is valid.
In general, our language L specifies all relations, both observable and unobservable.
Our notion of a theory is formally semantic, and consists of a class of structures. We
define a theory as a class of L-structures T axiomatized by some collection of universal
sentences. To model the idea that some relations are not observed, we consider a language
F , where all relation symbols in F are also symbols of L. The symbols in F correspond to
observable relations. We define a new theory F (T ) from our original theory by considering
the class of all structures which are elements of T , where the predicates corresponding
to L\F have been removed.
Our general result is that so long as T is universally axiomatizable, so is F (T ); and
further, it is axiomatized by the set of all universal consequences of T involving only
relations in F . This is exactly what we see in the case of the strong axiom: absence of
cycles including P are the only universal implications of our general theory which involve
only the symbols R and P .
We call our approach general revealed preference theory, as revealed preference theory
presumes that there is a preference relation generating choice behavior, but that this
preference relation is unobservable. Most revealed preference exercises can be framed
as special cases of the result here. However, our theorem is useful in establishing new
results. For example, our general result allows there to be multiple unobserved relations.
A recent branch of the revealed preference literature focuses on the empirical content of
group choice functions in games. The approach is as follows: a set of players is given,
and a set of strategies is given. For any nonempty set of strategies, for each agent, it is
imagined that a joint choice is observed from the game form derived from those sets. One
can ask whether or not the observed choices can be rationalized as Nash equilibria, or
as the Pareto optimal joint choices for some set of preferences. Examples of such papers
include Sprumont (2000), Xu and Zhou (2007), Galambos (2009), and Lee (2009). There
are older studies of the same questions, also about group choice, but using other solution
concepts: see Wilson (1970), Plott (1974), and Ledyard (1986).
Here, we work with a generalized notion of equilibrium which incorporates Nash equi-
librium, strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1960), and Pareto optimality as special cases.
We show that the theory hypothesizing that there exist strict preferences rationalizing
the observed choices is always universally axiomatizable, and hence falsifiable in principle.
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2 Main Results
2.1 Preliminary definitions
We proceed to give some standard definitions from model theory. Readers with at least
a minimal exposure to model theory or mathematical logic will want to skip this section.
We first must specify our language L. The language is a primitive and specifies the
syntax, or the things we can say.
1 Definition. A language L is given by specifying the following:
1. a set of predicate symbols R and positive integers nR for each R ∈ R
2. a set of constant symbols C.
The symbol R ∈ R is meant to denote a nR-ary relation. Note that we focus here on
languages without function symbols, so called relational languages.
The semantics are specified by concrete mathematical objects, called structures. Struc-
tures provide the appropriate framework for interpreting our syntax.
2 Definition. An L-structure M is given by the following:
1. a nonempty set M called the domain of M
2. a set RM ⊆MnR for each R ∈ R
3. an element cM ∈M for each c ∈ C.
When the language L is understood, we refer to an L-structure simply as a structure.
The elements RM and cM are called interpretations of the corresponding symbols in the
language L.
3 Definition. Suppose thatM and N are L-structures with universes M and N respec-
tively. An L-embedding η :M→ N is a one-to-one map η : M → N that preserves the
interpretations of all symbols of L: specifically,
1. RM(a1, ..., amR) if and only if R
N (η(a1), ..., η(amR)) for all R ∈ R and a1, ..., amR ∈
M
2. η(cM) = cN for c ∈ C.
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As a notational convention, we write RM(a1, ..., amR) to mean (a1, ..., amR) ∈ RM.
4 Definition. An isomorphism is a bijective L-embedding.
Appendix A gives definitions of sentence, and of the validity of a sentence in a struc-
ture. These notions correspond closely to their conventional meaning in English.
2.2 The Model
For a given first order language G, a G-theory is a class of structures for that language
which is closed under isomorphism. We say that a theory T is axiomatized by a collection
of sentences Σ if T consists of exactly of the structures for which each sentence in Σ is
valid. Given two theories, T and T ′, where T ⊆ T ′, we say that T is axiomatized by a
collection of sentences Σ with respect to T ′ if T consists of exactly those structures in T ′
for which each sentence in Σ is valid.
Let F = 〈R1, . . . , RN〉 and
L = 〈R1, . . . , RN , Q1, . . . , QK〉,
be languages, where all the Rn and Qk are predicate symbols. Note that F ⊆ L.
Let T be an L-theory. Define F (T ) to be the class of F -structures (X∗, R∗1, ..., R∗N) for
which there exist relations Q∗1, ..., Q
∗
K such that (X
∗, R∗1, ..., R
∗
N , Q
∗
1, ..., Q
∗
K) ∈ T . That
is, F (T ) is the projection of T onto the language F .
Given a collection of L-sentences Σ, the collection of F-implications of Σ is the
collection of all logical implications of L involving only predicates from F .
5 Theorem. If T has a universal L-axiomatization, then F (T ) has a universal F-
axiomatization. Moreover, if Σ is a universal axiomatization of T , then the collection of
universal F-implications of Σ is an axiomatization of F (T ).
Proof. We first establish that F (T ) is universally axiomatizable, using a theorem of
Tarski (1954). We then show what this axiomatization should be.
We want to verify the three conditions of Theorem 1.2 in Tarski (1954). Specifically,
conditions (i), (ii), and (iii’) in Tarski’s paper. To this end, we need to show that F (T ) is
closed under isomorphism and substructure. Lastly, we need to show that for any totally
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ordered set Θ and indexed collection of models Mθ ∈ F (T ) where if θ < θ′, then Mθ is
a substructure of Mθ′ , there is M∗ ∈ F (T ) for which each Mθ is a substructure ofM∗.
The first two conditions (closure under substructures and isomorphism) follow because
T satisfies those conditions as it is a universal theory. We prove the third condition.
Let Σ be a universal axiomatization of T .
Let Mθ = (Xθ, Rθ1, ..., RθN), θ ∈ Θ, be a monotone class of structures of F (T ).
That is, Θ is totally ordered, and Mθ is a substructure of Mθ′ whenever θ < θ′. Let
M∗ = (X∗, R∗1, . . . , R∗N) be defined so thatX∗ =
⋃
θX
θ andR∗k =
⋃
θ R
θ
k for k = 1, . . . , N .
For each θ, let W θ be the set of lists of relations (Q∗1, . . . , Q
∗
K) on X
∗ such that
(Xθ, Rθ1, . . . , R
θ
N , Q
∗
1|Xθ , . . . , Q∗K |Xθ)
is a model of Σ. Note that W θ 6= ∅ as Mθ ∈ F (T ).
We claim that if θ < θ′, then W θ
′ ⊆ W θ.
Let (Q∗1, . . . , Q
∗
K) ∈ W θ′ and let ϕ(x1, . . . , xM) ∈ Σ. Then by assumption, (Xθ′ , Rθ′1 . . . , Rθ′N , Q∗1|Xθ′ , . . . , Q∗K |Xθ′ )
is a model of ϕ, so ϕ(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
M) is valid for any {x∗1, . . . , x∗M} ⊆ Xθ′ ; in particular, it is
valid for any {x∗1, . . . , x∗M} ⊆ Xθ. Since for all i = 1, . . . , N , Rθi = Rθ′i ∩Xθ, ϕ is valid in
(Xθ, Rθ1, . . . , R
θ
N , Q
∗
1|Xθ , . . . , Q∗K |Xθ). As ϕ was arbitrary, (Q∗1, . . . , Q∗K) ∈ W θ.
Note that if Q is a k-ary relation on X∗, it is a subset of Xk. To this end, regard W θ
as a subset of
B = {0, 1}Π1X∗ × · · · × {0, 1}ΠKX∗ ,
where ΠkX
∗ stands for the product X∗ × . . . ,×X∗, as many times as the order of the
predicate Qk. Note that B, endowed with the product topology, is compact.
We claim that W θ, viewed as a subset of B, is closed. To see this, let (Qλ1 , . . . , QλK)
be a net in W θ, converging to (Q∗1, . . . , Q
∗
K). Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xM) be a formula in Σ and
{x∗1, . . . , x∗M} ⊆ Xθ. Then by definition of product topology convergence, there exists λ
such that if λ < λ, then for k = 1, . . . , K, Qλk(x
∗
1 . . . , x
∗
M) if and only if Q
∗
k(x
∗
1 . . . , x
∗
M).
Then, since
w = 〈Xθ, Rθ1, . . . , RθN , Qλ1 |Xθ , . . . , QλK |Xθ〉
is a model of ϕ, ϕ is valid at x∗1 . . . , x
∗
M for the interpretation of the predicate symbols
in w. So Qλk(x
∗
1 . . . , x
∗
M) if and only if Q
∗
k(x
∗
1 . . . , x
∗
M) implies that φ is valid at x
∗
1 . . . , x
∗
M
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for the interpretation of the predicate symbols in (Rθ1, . . . , R
θ
N , Q
∗
1|Xθ , . . . , Q∗K |Xθ). Thus
(Q∗1, . . . , Q
∗
K) ∈ W θ.
The collection W θ, θ ∈ Θ, is thus a nested collection of closed sets in a compact
space, so it has nonempty intersection. Conclude that there exists (Q∗1, . . . , Q
∗
K) ∈⋂
θ∈ΘW
θ. We claim that u∗ = (X∗, R∗1, . . . , R
∗
N , Q
∗
1, . . . , Q
∗
K) is a model of Σ. Let
ϕ(x1, . . . , xM) ∈ Σ and {x∗1 . . . , x∗M} ⊆ X∗. By definition of u∗, there is θ ∈ Θ such
that, for n = 1, . . . , N , R∗n(x
∗
1 . . . , x
∗
M) if and only if R
θ
n(x
∗
1 . . . , x
∗
M), and such that
{x∗1 . . . , x∗M} ⊆ Xθ. Since (Q∗1, . . . , Q∗K) ∈ W θ, ϕ(x∗1, . . . , x∗M) is valid under the interpre-
tation (Rθ1, . . . , R
θ
N , Q
∗
1|Xθ , . . . , Q∗K |Xθ). Hence, the fact that R∗n(x∗1 . . . , x∗M) if and only if
Rθn(x
∗
1 . . . , x
∗
M) implies that ϕ(x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
M) is valid under the interpretation (R
∗
1, . . . , R
∗
N , Q
∗
1, . . . , Q
∗
K).
Conclude that u∗ ∈ T . As F ({u∗}) =M∗, we obtainM∗ ∈ F (T ), establishing the third
condition.
Lastly, we now know that F (T ) has a universal axiomatization. Obviously, any
structure M ∈ F (T ) satisfies all universal F -implications of Σ. Conversely, we need
to show that any sentence in the universal axiomatization of F (T ) is a universal F -
implication of Σ. So suppose there is a sentence ϕ which is not. In particular then, there
exists a structure M ∈ T for which ϕ is not valid. But as ϕ involves only predicates
from F , it therefore follows that ϕ is also not valid for F (M), a contradiction (as ϕ is
valid for all members of F (T )).
2.3 Recursive Axiomatization
In this section, we are relatively informal. Details about computability theory can be
found in Rogers (1987).
Falsifiability means that if a theory is incorrect then its incorrectness can be demon-
strated. Assume that a scientist believes in some theory T , with universal axiomati-
zation Σ. Suppose that he observes the elements a1, . . . , an of some structure M, and
the relationship between them. If there exist some axiom φ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Σ such that
φ(a1, . . . , an) is not valid in M then T has been falsified. On the other hand, if none
of the axioms is violated, that does not prove the correctness of the theory, since the
axioms may still be violated on other elements ofM. This idea is the fundamental tenet
of Popper’s approach – theories can be falsified, but can never be proved.
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We now extend this idea to the process of checking whether observed data ((a1, . . . , an
and the relations between them) falsify the theory. To do that, our scientist needs an
effective procedure to produce a list of all the axioms in Σ, so that he can go over the
axioms and check their validity over the data set. Of course, the set of axioms might
be infinite (as in the case of the strong axiom of revealed preference, discussed in the
next section), which means that if the data violate an axiom, we will eventually find the
violations. If none of the axioms are violated, then our search will never end and we will
never know for sure that none of the axioms is violated. Again, theories are not proved,
only falsified.
Recall that a set Σ of formulas is called recursively enumerable (r.e.) if there exists a
Turing Machine that enumerates over the elements of Σ in some order. Thus, the output
of the machine is an exhaustive list φ1, φ2, . . . of all the elements of Σ.
The following is a simple corollary of Theorem 5
6 Corollary. If T has a recursively enumerable and universal axiomatization, then so
does F (T )
Proof. Let Σ be a r.e. set of universal formulas that axiomatizes T . It is well known
that the set of logical implications of a r.e. set of formulas is itself r.e. Thus, there
exists a Turing machine that enumerates all these logical implications ψ1, ψ2, . . . . We
augment this Turing machine by checking before printing each ψi whether it is a universal
sentence that contains only observable predicates, and print ψi only if it satisfies these
requirements. The augmented machine enumerates over all universal logical implications
of Σ that contain only observable predicates. By Theorem 5, this set axiomatizes F (T ).
7 Remark. A set is recursive if both it and its complement are r.e. By a theorem of Craig
(1953), a r.e. set Σ of universal axioms is equivalent to a recursive set Σ′ of axioms, where
each element of Σ′ is of the form ψ ∧ ψ . . . ψ for some ψ ∈ Σ. Note that the elements of
Σ′ are not, strictly speaking, universal sentences.
To understand the importance of Corollary 6, consider, for example, the strong axiom
of revealed preference. It is, as we emphasize in the next section, an infinite collection
of axioms in first order logic. However, there is a simple algorithm that, given a dataset
that violates SARP, determines that the theory has been falsified. In Theorem 5 we
obtain an axiomatization, but we would like it to be a test of the theory, in the same
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sense as SARP. The property of recursive enumerability ensures that an axiomatization
is such a test.
Another interpretation of Corollary 6 relies on an equivalent definition of recursive
enumerability: A set Σ is r.e. if there exists a Turing Machine that recognizes Σ, i.e.
halts on an input φ if and only if φ ∈ Σ. The Turing machine that recognizes Σ can be
thought of as a method of proof: to prove that some formula φ is in Σ, one needs to run
the machine until it halts. (On the other hand, if Σ is r.e. and φ /∈ Σ, then this assertion
may not be provable). Thus, Σ is r.e. if membership in Σ, if true, is provable.
Assume that a theory T has a universal r.e. axiomatization Σ, then if a structureM
is not in T then this fact is demonstrable in the following way: First, one has to come up
with an element φ(x1, . . . , xn) of Σ and elements a1, . . . , an of M such that φ(a1, . . . , an)
is not valid in M. Second, one has to use the Turing machine that recognizes Σ to
prove that indeed φ ∈ Σ. Thus, the existence of a universal r.e. axiomatization means
that if a structure is not in the theory then this fact can be demonstrated. This is what
falsifiability of T means.
2.4 Example: Individual rational choice
As an illustration of Theorem 5, consider the revealed preference formulation of the
theory of individual rational choice.
Consider the language F = 〈R,P 〉 with two binary predicates; R(x, y) is intended to
mean that x is revealed preferred to y, and P (x, y) that x is revealed strictly preferred
to y.
We are interested in the theory of all structures (X,RX , PX) for which there exists a
complete and transitive binary relation  satisfying the axioms
1. ∀x∀y(R(x, y)→ (x, y))
2. ∀x∀y(P (x, y)→ (x, y))
The language F expresses only observables, but the description we have of the theory
does not constitute a universal axiomatization. We want to know when we can formulate
the theory using only universal axioms that are statements about observables.
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We can extend the language to a language L, and formulate our theory using only
universal axioms. Let L = 〈R,P,,〉. Consider the set of L-sentences:
1. ∀x∀y( (x, y)∨  (y, x))
2. ∀x∀y( (x, y)↔ ( (x, y) ∧ ¬  (y, x)))
3. ∀x∀y∀z( (x, y)∧  (y, z))→ (x, z)
4. ∀x∀y(R(x, y)→ (x, y))
5. ∀x∀y(P (x, y)→ (x, y))
Let T be the L-theory axiomatized by this set of sentences.
Now, T is a description of the theory of rational choice, but it assumes that we can
access, or observe, the relation . The theory we are really interested in is F (T ): the
projection of T onto the language F .
Since the axioms (1)-(5) are a universal axiomatization of T , Theorem 5 implies that
there is a universal axiomatization of F (T ). In addition, one such axiomatization is given
by the implications of (1)-(5) that only involve the predicates R and P .
To be concrete, this axiomatization is described by a variant of the strong axiom of
revealed preference. In fact, in first order logic, the strong axiom of revealed preference
is a collection of axioms.
The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference: For every k,
∀x1...∀xk¬
k∧
i=1
(
xi Qi x(i+1) mod k
)
where for all i, Qi ∈ {R,P}, and for at least one i ∈ {1, ..., k}, Qi = P .
8 Proposition. If T is axiomatized by (1)-(5), then F (T ) is axiomatized by the strong
axiom of revealed preference.
Proof. We offer a sketch, as this type of argument is well-understood. Clearly the strong
axiom is valid for F (T ). Now suppose that (X,RX , PX) is a model of the theory de-
scribed by the strong axiom. We want to show it is an element of F (T ). Let Q denote the
transitive closure of RX ∪ PX . Note that if PX(x, y), then ¬Q(y, x) (this follows by the
11
strong axiom of revealed preference). Consequently, denoting the strict part of Q by PQ,
we obtain ∀x∀yRX(x, y) → Q(x, y) and ∀x∀yPX(x, y) → PQ(x, y). Now, by a general-
ization of the Szpilrajn Theorem (see, for example, Suzumura (1976), Theorem 3), Q has
an extension to a weak order  with strict part , so that ∀x∀yQ(x, y) → (x, y) and
∀x∀yPQ(x, y)→ (x, y). Consequently, ∀x∀yRX(x, y)→ (x, y) and ∀x∀yPX(x, y)→
(x, y), where  is a weak order and  is its strict part. This verifies that (X,RX , PX) ∈
F (T ), as (X,RX , PX ,,) ∈ T .
3 Rationalizing group choice behavior
In this section, we look at Nash equilibrium behavior. We assume that we observe a
collection of game forms, and a choice made from each game form. We ask whether or
not there could exist strict preferences for a collection of agents over those game forms
which generate the observed choices as Nash equilibrium behavior. We show, using
Theorem 5, that this theory has a universal axiomatization.
We first have to set up our framework. Instead of focusing on Nash equilibrium specif-
ically, we work with a general collection of theories of group choice. Nash equilibrium,
strong Nash equilibrium, and Pareto optimal choice are special cases. We fix a finite set
of agents N = {1, ..., n} and a collection Γ ⊆ 2N\{∅}. The elements of Γ are the sets of
agents that can deviate from a profile of strategies.
A game form is a tuple (S1, ..., Sn), where we think of Si as the set of strategies
available to agent i. For each profile of preferences (1, . . . ,n), a game form (S1, ..., Sn)
defines a normal-form game
(S1, ..., Sn,1, . . . ,n).
Here preferences j are defined over
∏
i∈N Si, the set of all strategy profiles.
We will define a Γ-Nash equilibrium of a game (S1, ..., Sn,1, ...,n) to be s ∈
∏
i∈N Si
for which for all γ ∈ Γ and all s′ ∈∏i∈N Si, if there exists j ∈ γ for which (s′γ, s−γ) j s,
then there exists k ∈ γ for which s k (s′γ, s−γ).
So the following are special cases:
• Nash equilibrium results when Γ = {{i} : i ∈ N}
• Pareto optimality results when Γ = {N}
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• Strong Nash equilibrium results when Γ = 2N\{∅}
Other kinds of theories are permissible. For example, by setting Γ = {G : |G| >
|N |/2}, we get a kind of majority rule core.
We imagine that we observe a collection of game forms, and some strategy profiles
which are chosen from each. We do not necessarily observe the entire collection of strategy
profiles which could potentially be chosen.
We ask when the strategy profiles are rationalizable by a list of preference relations;
obviously, if we make no restriction on preferences, then every strategy profile is ratio-
nalizable by complete indifference. To this end, we require that preferences be strict over
strategy profiles. This is a significant assumption.
Let us define the language of group choice F to include the following predicates:
• For each i ∈ N , one unary predicate Si, where Si(y) is intended to mean that y is
a set of strategies for i
• For each i ∈ N , one unary predicate si, where si(x) means that x is a strategy for
i
• The typical set theoretic binary predicate ∈, meant to signify participation in a set
• A 2n-ary predicate R, where R(y1, ..., yn, x1, ..., xn) means that (x1, ..., xn) is ob-
served as being chosen from game form (y1, ..., yn)
The theory of group choice TG is the class of all structures for the preceding language
for which there exists for each agent a global strategy space Si for which the following
objects are elements of the universe
• Each nonempty Si ⊆ Si
• Each si ∈ Si
and each of the predicates Si, si, ∈ are interpreted properly. For each game form∏
i S
∗
i and strategy profile (s
∗
1, ..., s
∗
n), R(S
∗
1 , ..., S
∗
n, s
∗
1, ..., s
∗
n) implies that Si(S
∗
i ), si(s
∗
i ),
and lastly that s∗i ∈ S∗i .
The theory of Γ-rationalizable choice TΓ ⊆ TG is the theory of group choice for which
for each i ∈ N , there exists a linear order i over
∏
i∈N Si for which for all game
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forms
∏
i S
∗
i , R(S
∗
1 , ..., S
∗
n, s
∗
1, ..., s
∗
n) implies that (s
∗
1, ..., s
∗
n) is a Γ-Nash equilibrium of
the normal-form game (S∗1 , ..., S
∗
n,1, . . . ,n).
9 Theorem. The theory of Γ-rationalizable choice is universally and recursively enu-
merably axiomatizable with respect to the theory of group choice.
Note that Theorem 9 deals with the universal axiomatization of Γ-rationalizable choice
with respect to the theory of group choice. We do not here want to focus on axiomatiz-
ing group choice; we want to focus only on the additional empirical content of Γ-Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the language L which includes all predicates in F , but also includes, for
each agent i, a 2n-ary predicate i.
We use the abbreviation
k (x1, ..., xn, z1, ..., zn) =k (x1, ..., xn, z1, ..., zn) ∨
(
n∧
i=1
xi = zi
)
.
For each γ ∈ Γ and k ∈ γ, we use the following shorthand:
If |γ| > 1,
ϕγ,k(x1, ..., xn, z1, ..., zn) =
k ((zγ, x−γ), x)→
∨
i∈γ\{k}
i (x, (zγ, x−γ))
otherwise, if |γ| = 1,
ϕγ,k(x1, ..., xn, z1, ..., zn) =k (x1, ..., xn, z1, ..., zn).
Consider the theory T axiomatized by the following sentences.
For each γ ∈ Γ and k ∈ γ,
14
∀x1...∀xn∀y1...∀yn∀z1...∀zn∧
i∈γ
∈ (zi, yi) ∧
∧
i∈N
∈ (xi, yi) ∧R(y1, ..., yn, x1, ..., xn)
→ ϕγ,k(x1, ..., xn, z1, ..., zn)
Completeness: For each k ∈ N ,
∀s1...∀sn∀s′1...∀s′n
n∧
i=1
si(si) ∧
n∧
i=1
si(s
′
i)→ (k (s1, ..., sn, s′1, ..., s′n)∨ k (s′1, ..., s′n, s1, ..., sn))
Transitivity:
∀s1...∀sn∀s′1...∀s′n∀s′′1...∀s′′n
n∧
i=1
si(si) ∧
n∧
i=1
si(s
′
i) ∧
n∧
i=1
si(s
′′
i )
→ (k (s1, ..., sn, s′1, ..., s′n)∧ k (s′1, ..., s′n, s′′1, ..., s′′n)→k (s1, ..., sn, s′′1, ..., s′′n))
Asymmetry:
∀s1∀s2...∀sn∀s′1...∀s′n(
n∧
i=1
si(si) ∧
n∧
i=1
si(s
′
i)
)
∨
(
n∨
i=1
si 6= s′i
)
¬ (k (s1, ..., sn, s′1, ..., s′n)∧ k (s′1, ..., s′n, s1, ..., sn))
As T has a universal axiomatization, so does F (T ). Since the axiomatization of
T is finite, F (T ) has a recursively enumerable universal axiom by Corollary 6. And
TΓ = F (T ) ∩ TG. So TΓ has a r.e. universal axiomatization within TG.
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Because we ask for group choice functions to be rationalizable by strict preferences,
the exercise here is similar in spirit to Afriat (1967), who assumes partial observations of
demand functions and asks demand functions to be rationalizable by locally non-satiated
preference.
On the other hand, we could construct an exercise similar to Richter (1966), assuming
that not all game forms are observable, but that given a game form is observed, all
possible choices from that game form are observed. Studying such an object would
involve constructing a richer language (that allows us to speak of game forms), but we also
conjecture that the theory of Γ-rationalizable group choice functions is not universally
axiomatizable in this context.3
4 Relation to the existing previous literature
The type of issues we discuss here have previously been studied by philosophers of sci-
ence. Without going into full detail, Ramsey (1931) was one of the first to discuss the
elimination of “theoretical” terms from scientific theories. Various authors give different
interpretation to the notion of “Ramsey elimination.” The work of Sneed (1971) includes
notions very similar to ours; in particular, he defines a finitely axiomatized L- theory T
to be Ramsey eliminable if F (T ) is a finitely axiomatized F -theory. In particular, he
includes an example (attributed to Dana Scott) of a theory T which is first order ax-
iomatizable, but for which F (T ) is not first order axiomatizable. We include here an
adaptation of this example.
10 Example. Let F = 〈R〉, where R is a unary predicate, and let L = 〈R,Q〉, where Q
is a binary predicate. Consider the L-theory T axiomatized by the following sentences:
1. ∀x∀yQ(x, y)→ R(x) ∧ ¬R(y)
2. ∀xR(x)→ (∃yQ(x, y) ∧ (∀zQ(x, z)→ y = z))
3. ∀x¬R(x)→ (∃yQ(y, x) ∧ (∀zQ(z, x)→ y = z))
3This departs from the single agent case, where single agent choice is known to be universally ratio-
nalizable.
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Thus, T is the theory of all structures (X,RX , QX) for which there is a one-to-one
correspondence QX between the elements of RX and its complement.
11 Proposition. F (T ) is not first order F-axiomatizable.
Proof. Suppose by means of contradiction that there is a first order axiomatization of
F (T ). Consider a structure (X,RX) where |RX | is infinite, |X\RX | is infinite, and the
cardinalities of RX and X\RX are distinct. Note that (X,RX) 6∈ F (T ).
By the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem, (see for example Marker (2002), Theorem 2.3.7),
there exists a countable structure (X ′, RX
′
) which satisfies exactly the same first order
sentences as (X,RX). But note in particular that for each n > 0, the sentence
∃x1...∃xn
n∧
i=1
R(xi) ∧
∧
i 6=j
(¬(xi = xj))
is valid for (X,RX); in particular, then, it is valid for (X ′, RX
′
); consequently, |RX′ | is
infinite. Similarly, since
∃x1...∃xn
n∧
i=1
¬R(xi) ∧
∧
i 6=j
(¬(xi = xj))
is valid for (X,RX), it is also valid for (X ′, RX
′
) and hence |X ′\RX′ | is infinite. Since X ′
is countable, there is therefore a bijection between RX
′
and X\RX′ , so that (X ′, RX′) ∈
F (T ). But then (X,RX) satisfies the sentences axiomatizing F (T ) (as it satisfies the same
sentences as (X ′, RX
′
) and (X ′, RX
′
) ∈ F (T )). So (X,RX) ∈ F (T ), a contradiction.
The preceding example is important in that it illustrates that the problem of axiomati-
zability of F (T ) is non-trivial. To this end, Van Benthem (1978) (Theorem 4.2) uncovers
necessary and sufficient conditions for F (T ) to be first order axiomatizable, given that T
is first order axiomatizable. His conditions are essentially an adaptation of a well-known
theorem in model theory axiomatizing those theories which are first order axiomatizable
(see, for example Chang and Keisler (1990) Theorem 4.1.12). The condition is a semantic
condition requiring one to verify, for any model of F (T ), whether any structure which
satisfies exactly the same F -sentences is also a model of F (T ). In practice, this is nearly
impossible to verify. Our condition; on the other hand, is a syntactic condition which is
trivial to verify.
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Economists have also discussed these issues. It is well-known to economists that
the theory of rational choice is falsifiable. Simon (1985) discusses the issue we discuss
here. Simon argues that the theory is falsifiable, even though the RP formulation of the
theory is existentially quantified over unobservables. As Simon (1985) states, “although
existential quantification of an observable is fatal to the falsifiability of a theory, the same
is not true when the existentially quantified term is a theoretical one.”
While this may seem obvious to many, it has led to a large degree of confusion among
economists. For example Boland (1981) argued that the theory of rational choice is
not falsifiable precisely because of its existential formulation over unobservables. In his
words:
Given the premise–“All consumers maximize something”–the critic can claim
he has found a consumer who is not maximizing anything. The person who
assumed the premise is true can respond: “You claim you have found a con-
sumer who is not a maximizer but how do you know there is not something
which he is maximizing?” In other words, the verification of the counterex-
ample requires the refutation of a strictly existential statement; and as stated
above, we all agree that one cannot refute existential statements.
Mongin (1986) beautifully counters this argument. In this context, he has already
observed that all F -implications of T are F -implications of F (T ). It follows from this
that if T is universal, then F (T ) has universal implications, and is hence falsifiable.
As noted above, we have gone further than this in showing that in fact, F (T ) is first-
order axiomatizable (indeed, universally axiomatizable). Hence all of its implications are
falsifiable.
Our work is related to the approach in Brown and Matzkin (1996), and the general
approach to testable implications discussed in Brown and Kubler (2008). In these papers,
as in ours, there is an operation of projection to eliminate certain existential quantifi-
cations. The idea in Brown-Matzkin and in Brown-Kubler is to exploit the property of
quantifier elimination in certain mathematical theories. Our work, on the other hand,
uses results from model theory on when a universal axiomatization is possible. Our pro-
jection argument follows from the verification that the universal axiomatization can be
projected. We do not exploit the property of quantifier elimination of the mathematical
theory underlying the economic model (indeed our results may apply when quantifier
elimination does not hold).
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In our previous paper, Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya (2010), we dealt with the-
ories which could be axiomatized by what we called UNCAF formulas, for universal
negation of conjunction of atomic formulas. Under certain conditions, being UNCAF ax-
iomatizable is equivalent to being universally axiomatizable. And in fact, we show there
that a result akin to Theorem 5 is true for UNCAF sentences. This proof relies on dras-
tically different techniques, as there are deep differences between theories axiomatizable
by UNCAF sentences and those which are only universally axiomatizable. In particular,
theories which are UNCAF axiomatizable are closed under weak substructures (and not
just substructures), a property that plays a critical role in our previous paper.
The reason Theorem 5 is useful is because, in general, the hypothesized theory T is
usually not axiomatizable by UNCAF sentences. For example, the axioms of completeness
and transitivity for binary relations have no UNCAF axiomatization. In general, then, it
is impossible to obtain any results about the falsifiability of a revealed preference theory
without having some result about universality.
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Appendix A Basic definitions from Model Theory
The following definitions are taken, for the most part, quite literally from (Marker, 2002),
pp. 8-12. We refer readers to this excellent text for more details; but present the basics
here to keep the analysis self-contained. The x notation is here used to denote a list, or
vector, or elements (x1, ..., xm).
12 Definition. M is a substructure of N if M ⊆ N and the inclusion map ι : M → N
defined by ι(m) = m for all m ∈M is an L-embedding.
The following definition gives us the basic building blocks of our syntax. Note that
we include a countable list of “variables” to be used in this definition; these are not part
of the language per se, but rather part of a “meta language” in that they are present in
all languages.
13 Definition. The set of L-terms is the smallest set T E such that
1. c ∈ T E for each constant symbol c ∈ C
2. each variable symbol vi ∈ T E for i = 1, 2, ...,
3. if t1, ..., tnf ∈ T E and f ∈ F , then f(t1, ..., tnf ) ∈ T E .
The following definitions mark our departure from Marker. Specifically, we want to
allow atomic formulas to include expressions involving the 6= sign–and we want to include
this symbol as part of our meta-language, in the sense that it is present in every language.
14 Definition. Say that φ is an atomic L-formula if φ is one of the following
1. t1 = t2, where t1 and t2 are terms
2. t1 6= t2, where t1 and t2 are terms
3. R(t1, ..., tnR), where R ∈ R and t1, ..., tnR are terms
15 Definition. The set of L-formulas is the smallest set W containing the atomic
formulas such that
1. if φ is in W , then ¬φ is in W
2. if φ and ψ, then (φ ∧ ψ) and (φ ∨ ψ) are in W
3. if φ is in W , then ∃viφ and ∀viφ are in W .
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16 Definition. A variable v occurs freely in a formula φ if it is not inside a ∃v or ∀v
quantifier. It is bound in φ if it does not occur freely in φ.
17 Definition. A sentence is a formula φ with no free variables.
We are now prepared to define a concept of “truth” relating syntax and semantics.
We want to define what it means for a sentence to be true in a given structure. The
notion we define here is slightly different than Marker, as it again relies on the correct
interpretation of the 6= symbol, which is not a primitive there (nor in any other standard
text).
18 Definition. Let φ be a formula with free variables from v = (vi1 , ..., vim), and let
a = (ai1 , ..., aim) ∈ Mm. We inductively define M |= φ(a) as follows. The notation
M 6|= ψ(a) means that M |= φ(a) is not true.
1. If φ is t1 = t2, then M |= φ(a) if tM1 (a) = tM2 (a)
2. If φ is t1 6= t2, then M |= φ(a) if tM1 (a) 6= tM2 (a)
3. If φ is R(t1, ..., tnR), then M |= φ(a) if (tM1 (a), ..., tMnR(a)) ∈ RM
4. If φ is ¬ψ, then M |= φ(a) if M 6|= ψ(a)
5. If φ is (ψ ∧ θ), then M |= φ(a) if M |= ψ(a) and M |= θ(a)
6. If φ is (ψ ∨ θ), then M |= φ(a) if M |= ψ(a) or M |= θ(a)
7. If φ is ∃vjψ(v, vj), then M |= φ(a) if there is b ∈M such that M |= ψ(a, b)
8. If φ is ∀vjψ(v, vj), then M |= φ(a) if for all b ∈M , M |= ψ(a, b).
19 Definition. M satisfies φ(a) or φ(a) is true in M if M |= φ(a).
Lastly, for our purposes, it is useful to have a notion of a universal sentence.
20 Definition. A universal sentence or universal formula is a sentence of the form
∀vφ(v), where φ is quantifier free.
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